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marine insurance P" The Lord Justice
then proceeds to combat the views on
that point both of CrITTY, J., in the

court below, and of the Judges who
decided the American cases, who had
fallen into a mistake in relying upon
a distinction between fire and marine insurance. "Whereas," says lie"there is
no real distinction except in the diversity
of the subject-matter insured." He then
proceeds to quote from the opinion of
SHAW, C. J., in King v. State Mut. Ins.

Co., 7 Cash. (Mass.) 12, where he says,
commenting on the case of Tyler v.
The A.Btna ns. Co., 16 Wend. (N. Y.)
385 : "Looking at the analogies and
illustrations on which the reasoning of
the learned chancellor is founded, it
may be a question whether he has not
relied too much on the cases of marine
insurance, in which the doctrines of constructive total loss, abandonment and
salvage are fully acknowledged, but

which have slight application to insurances against loss by fire." Admitting
the but slight application," the Lord Justice says: "That is not because a contract of fire insurance is not a contract
of indemnity, but because the subjectmatter of the two classes of cases is
different."
A reference to the Act of Parliament
mentioned by JAMsES, L. J., in Bayner

v. Preston, was made in the note to that
case in 21 Am. Law Reg. 97, where it
was shown that this act had no reference
to a mere executory contract between
vendor and vendee, although, as having
for its object the protection of all those
having existing interests in or ownerships of the premises, under certain
circumstances named in the act itbelf,
it so far supports the views taken in the
cases cited in the note appended to that
case.
HuGHt WntonGvrA .

New York.

RECENT

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
JOHNSON, ADMit., v. HUNT.
An agreement, for a valuable consideration, to interfere to bring about a marriage
between others is void.
To make a plea of accord and satisfaction good, where the accord was to do a
thing in satisfaction at a future day, it must be alleged that the services performed
were accepted in satisfaction of the debt or claim against the defendant; to allege that
the party agreed to accept the services in satisfaction is not sufficient.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRYOR, J.-The appellee, George W. Hunt, on the 1st of January in the year 1877, borrowed of his grandfather, Thomas JohnVOL. XXXI.-98
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son, the sum of $5000, for which he executed his note payable in
three years with eight per cent. interest from the time of its execution. The grandfather died, and his personal representatives
instituted an action at law upon the note, to which the appellee
pleaded in substance that decedent being a widower, and desirous
of again marrying, had offered a relative the sum of $10,000 to aid
him in procuring him a wife, and his relatives (except the appellee)
opposing a second marriage, the grandfather, in consideration that
the appellee would assist him in procuring a wife, agreed that he
would, as a compensation therefor, release and give up to the
appellee the note in controversy.
The name of the young lady having been suggested, the appellee
alleges that he wrote letters to her for his grandfather, and did all
in his power to accomplish the purpose in view. That he had not
only complied with his contract, but used his influence with others
to marry his aged relative. He therefore asks that the note be
delivered up, &c. To this answer a demurrer was filed and sustained, and thereupon the appellee filed an amended answer, in
which he alleges that his grandfather was seventy-seven years of
age, feeble and unable to ride on horseback, and that in consideration that he, the appellee, would write letters to the young lady
for him, and see that they were delivered, &c., that he would give
him the note for $5000. That he fully complied with the agreement, by writing the letters, and delivering them to the young lady,
and therefore the note was fully discharged.
The demurrer to the answer, as amended, was overruled, and the
case went to the jury, upon an issue made by the administrators as
to the existence of any such agreement, and a verdict returned for
the defendant.
The answer is but a plea of accord and satisfaction, and to make
such a plea good, it should be alleged that the services performed
were accepted in satisfaction of the debt, or claim against the
defendant, and to allege that the party agreed to accept them in
satisfaction is bad pleading.
When the accord is to do a thing in satisfaction at a future day,
and the act is done and accepted on that day, it is in law a satisfaction, and no action can be maintained on the original demand.
The plea must allege that the matter was accepted in satisfaction :
Hfearn v. MEiehl, 38 Penn. St. 147; Ohitty on Cont., p. 1123:
If the intestate agreed to accept the services of the appellee in dis-
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charge of the note, and failed to comply with his agreement, if the
contract is otherwise unobjectionable, the remedy is by an action for
the breach of the contract.
The most fatal objection to the defence is that the contract, as
alleged, is void, and the proof in no manner aids the pleading or
verdict rendered. It is alleged that the grandfather was advanced
in years, too feeble to ride and unable to write, and that the appellee
(his grandson) undertook to write his letters to the young lady and
deliver them, and the young lady says those letters had reference
to a matrimonial alliance with the old gentleman.
The principal witness for the appellee states that in a conversation with the old man, the latter said he had agreed to give the
grandson the note, if he would assist him in marrying. That Hunt
was to do his writing, &c., and was complying with his agreement.
The same statement is made by other witnesses, who speak of conversations with this old man, in which he spoke of his matrimonial
prospects, and of the appellee, as the instrument through which
success was to be accomplished.
He said to a lady witness that George was complying with his
contract like a Turk. The defence made as well as the testimony
in support of it, shows clearly (if any contract was made) a marriage brokerage agreement; the young man undertaking to bring
about the marriage, in consideration of the surrender of the note
for $5000.
The interference by one, upon an agreement to receive a monied
or valuable consideration, to induce or bring about a marriage between others, has always been held void. Such contracts, if carried
out, result in unhappy marital relations, and have been discountenanced by the law.
The elementary authorities, as well as the reported cases, all
sustain this view of such a contract. We have seldom seen a more
flimsy defence than has been made in this case. The declarations
of an old, feeble and diseased man, with reference to a contemplated
marriage, is made the sole foundation for defeating the recovery.
The appellee promised to pay the note time and again,,after the
death of his grandfather, and there can be no -doubt, from the
proof in the record, that the statements made by the intestate were
mere expressions of an intention to give without any consideration
whatever. He died in possession of the note, and it passed into
the hands of the administrators.
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The court below should have sustained the demurrer to the
answer as amended, and failing to do that, should have instructed
the jury to find for the plaintiff: Smith on Cont. p. 221 ; Cole v.
Gibson, 1 Vesey 503; .Denny and Hook v. Fernon, Fonblanque's
Equity 212.
The judgment below is reversed, and cause remanded, with directions to award a new trial, and to sustain the demurrer to the defence
made, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
void, and the estate discharged of it as
if no such lease had been made." A
better report of the case appears in
Finch's Precedents, p. 165; s. c. Parl.
Cases 57 ; 2 Eq. Abr. c. 1 ; 14 Viner
Abr. 160. Another report of this case,
under another name, says it was held
that such contracts "are of dangerous
consequence, and not to be allowed :"
Hall v. Keene, 3 Levinz 411. In another report of this case it is said, "that
marriages ought to be procured and
promoted by the mediation of friends
and relations, and not of hirelings:"
Show. Cas. 78.
An earlier case thn the one just cited
was Drury v. Hooke, I Fern. 412 ; s. c.
2 Ch. Cas. 176; Eq. Cas. Abr. 89, pl.
2, which is reported as follows: "The
bill was to be relieved against a marriage brocage bond; and it appearing
that the marriage was brought about
without the consent of the young woman's parents, who were then living,
the Lord Chancellor, for. that reason
alone, decreed the bond to be delivered
One of the earliest cases upon the up, terming it a sort of kidnapping,
subject of the principal case was Stribble- and said there was a material difference
where the parties were at their own dishill v. Brett, 2 Vern. 445, decided Nov.
13, 1702, in the House of Lords. Colposal, and where their parents were
onel Brett bad procured a marriage living; though such a bond was in no
between Mr. Thynn and Lady Ogle,
case to be countenanced." A note to
and in consideration thereof received a
this case adds : "It appeared upon the
lease of cetain lands. The lease was pleadings in this case, that the defendant
set aside upon the ground that it was agreed to abate 401. in every 10001.,
based upon an unjust consideration.
if the portion of the intended wife should
The case is very short, and no opinion fall short of the sum named, as her porwas given except a remark that, "if
tion by defendant namely, 40001., the
the lease was gained by fraud, or an
bond from the plaintiff being to secure
unjust consideration, it is to be deemed
1601." Smith v. Bruaing, 2'Vern. 392,

IARnuAGn BxoxERAGE.-It is seldom that such cases as the principal one
find their way into the courts. There is
but one American case reported ; and
the English cases are all of an early
date.
Story places the subject of Marriage
Brokerage Contracts under the head of
Constructive Fraud ; and compares it
with agreements mtade to give a reward
for using influence and power over another person to induce him to make a will
in favor of the obligor, and for his benefit;
or secret contracts made with parents or
guardians upon a treaty of marriage, to
the effect that they are to receive a compensation, security or benefit for promoting the marriage, or giving their
consent to it and the like : Story Eq.
Jur., sects. 265, 266.
The civil law allowed match-makers
(proxenetae) to ply their vocation, and
receive a reward for their services to a
limited extent: Cod. Lib. 5 tit. 1, 1. 6.
See Crawford v. Bussell, 62 Barb. 92,
97.
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is as follows: "The court not only decreed a marriage brocago bond to be
delivered up, but a gratuity of fifty
guineas actually paid to be refunded."
In many of the cases cited it will be
observed that the court ordered the bond
to be delivered up; but where the plaintiff alleged that he bad given a note for
such a contract, and asked for an injunction to restrain any assignment of
it, and to order it delivered up, the
court refused the latter request, but
granted the former: Smith v. Aykwell,
3 Atkyn. 566.
Such bonds are set aside, "not for the
party's sake, but. for the benefit of the
public :" Debenham v. Ox, I Ves. Sr.
276, 277 ; Gale v. Gibson, Id. 503;
Pitcairnv. Ogbourne, 2 Id. 375 ; Hylton
v. Hylton, Id. 547; Booth v. Bearl of
Wrarrington, 4 Bro. P. C. 163.
In an American case it was said:
"Thus
marriage brokerage & bonds,
which are not fraudulent on either
party, are yet void, because they are a
fraud on third persons and are a public mischief, as they have a tendency
to cause matrimony to be contracted on
mistaken principles, and without the
advice of friends ; and they are relieved
against as a general mischief, for the
sake of the public :" Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass. 112, 118.
In an action it was alleged that the
plaintiff and defendant entered into an
agreement in writing, by which the
former agreed that she would do all in
her power to aid in a marriage between
one R. and the defendant; in consideration whereof the defendant promised that in case she became the wife
of R., and outlived him, she would pay
the plaintiff, for her services in the
matter, $2000 in cash. It was further
alleged that R. was a widower, possessing great wealth, that the plaintiff performed the agreement on her part, and
that R. and the defendant were lawfully
married, and lived together happily for
many years, when R. died, leaving the

defendant $50,000. A demand of performance, and refusal by the defendant,
were then alleged. Upon this complaint
the plaintiff was nonsuited, on the
ground that the agreement was a marriage brokerage contract, and therefore.
void as being against public policy. It
was also held in this case that the agreement being void, the claim for advances
of money and services performed under
it must fall with the agreement itself:
Crawford v. Russell, 62 Barb. 92.
Even a bond given after marriage in
cormideration of assistance rendered by
the obligee in effecting the obligor's
marriage has been held void : Williamson
v. Gihon, 2 Sch. & L. 357.
AccosD

AND

SATISpACTION.-Dr.

Wharton defines an accord and satisfaction as "an agreement to accept in
satisfaction of a debt something at the
time received. (Citing Bac. Abr. Accord; Com. Dig. Accord and Sat.;
Kaye v. Waghorne, 1 Taunt. 428.)
The accord is the agreement for the
reception of the thing in discharge of
the debt; the satisfaction is the actual
reception of the thing." This definition
is supported by the following authorities,
where the terms have been defined :
Pulliam v. Taylor, 50 Miss. 257 ; Bull
v. Bull, 43 Conn. 462; Line v. Nelson,
9 Yr. (N. J.) 362; Preston v. Grant,
34 Yt. 203 ; Cumber v. Wane, 1 Sm.
L. Cas. 445.
All the authorities are in harmony
that there must be an acceptance, and
without that, the accord is no defence:
lRockton v. Hall, 14 Q. B. 380 ; Hall
v. Flockton, 16 Id. 1039.
To be a bar to a writ, the accord must
be executed before the action is brought :
Woodruff v. Dobbins, 7 Blackf. 582;
Frost v. Johnson, 8 Ohio 393 ; Ballard
v. Noaks, 2 Pike (Ark.) 45; Spruneberer v. Dentler, 4 Watts (Pa.) 126 ;
Simmons v. Hamilton, 56 Cal. 493;
Keeler v. Neal, 2 Watts (Pa.) 424;
Brooklyn Bank v. Grew, 23 Wend.
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342; Anderson v. Turnpike Co., 16
Johns. 86; Russell v. Lytle, 6 Wend.
390; Cooper v. Parker, 15 C. B. 822;
Warren v. Skinner, 20 Conn. 559;
Bayleyv. Horman,3 Bing. (N. S.) 920 ;
°Collingbourne v. Manteil, 5 M. & W.
292; Brown v. Perkins, 1 Hare 564;
Smith v. Bartholomew, 1 Met. 276;
Gabriel v. Dresser, 15 0. B. 622.
If the accord was a satisfaction without its being executed, the plaintiff would
be in an anomalous position; for he
would be defeated in his suit, with no
means to enforce the performance of satisfaction in those instances where something else than the payment of money
was agreed to be made or done. In
such a position, the plaintiff's only
remedy would be an action for a breach
of the contract.
Until satisfaction has taken place the
accord is a mere negotiation. Therefore,
until satisfaction is received, the creditor
may withdraw his acceptance: Allen v.
Barris, 1 Ld. Raym. 122 : Young v.
Tgett, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 447 ; Massey
v. .Johnson, 1 Exch. 256 ; Noe v.
Christie, 51 N. Y. 270; Spence v.
Healey, 8 Exch. 668; Reeves v. Hearne,
I Al. & W. 323; White v. Gray, 68
Me. 579 ; Pope v. Tunstall, 2 Pike
(Ark.) 209; Woodward v. Miles, 24
N. H. 293; Overton v. Conner, 50
Texas 113; Logan v. Austin, 1 Stew.
(Ala.) 476; Hearn v. Kiehl, 38 Pa.
St. 149 ; Hall v. Smith, 10 Iowa 48 ;
Simmons v. Clark, 56 fll. 96 ; lack
v. Garland,8 Md. 191. See Ellis v. Bitzer, 2 Ohio 91 ; Cuxon v. Chadley, 3 B.
& C. 591 ; Panzerbeiter v. Waydell, 21
Hun 161 ; Kromer v. Beim, 75 N. Y.
574 ; Costello v. Cady, 102 Mass. 140;
Bragg v. Pierce, 53 Me. 65.
A., the payee of certain mortgage
notes made by B., sued B. for the
amount due. B. alleged in defence an

agreement with A., by which B. was to
find a purchaser for the mortgaged realty,
who was to pay the arrears of interest,
refund certain expenses, and execute
new notes to A., whereupon A. was to
accept the purchaser as his debtor and
discharge B. B. averred that he found
such a purchaser but that A. refused to
consummate the agreement. A. sold
the realty at auction under the mortgage
power, bought it in, and brought the
suit in question to recover a balance due
on the notes. It was held that the defence was bad as an accord and satisfaction, because it only showed a readiness on the part of B. to join A. in
executing the accord, but showed no
satisfaction nor execution of the accord:
Petta v. Ray, 12 R. I. 344.
C. purchased the defendant's millinery
goods, and in part consideration thereof,
agreed to pay the defendant's debt to
the plailtiff. C. thereupon wrote the
plaintiff that her husband proposed to
give his note on six months for the debt,
and the plaintiff replied accepting the
proposition. The note was never given,
but C. made remittances to the plaintiff
from time to time, to apply on the debt.
It was held that the negotiations were a
mere accord, and that the defendant was
not thereby discharged from the balance
of the debt: Rising v. Cummings, 47
Vt. 345. See M1olyneaux v. Collier, 2
Am. L. Reg. (0. S.) 379 ; City of
Memphis v. Brown, 11 Am. L. Reg.
(N. S.) 629.
That the plea must allege that the
matter was accepted in satisfaction. See
Sinard v. Patterson, 3 Blackf. 354;
Maze v. Miller, I Wash. C. C. 328;
Morris Canal Co. v. Van Vorst, 1 Zab.
(N. J.) 101; Smith's L. Cas. 606
(7th Am.ed.).
W. W. THORNTON.
Crawfordsville, Ind.
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Supreme Court of Ohio.
JESSE S. NORTON v. CHESTER BLINN.
While courts will not enforce an illegal contract between the parties, yet, if an
agent of one of the parties has, in the prosecution of the illegal enterprise for his
principal, received money or other property belonging to his principal, he is bound
to tarn it over to him, and cannot shield himself from liability therefor upon the
ground of the illegality of the original transaction.

ERROR to the District Court of Lucas County.
About the 1st of May 1872, Chester Blinn placed in the bands
of Jesse S. Norton, at Toledo, Ohio, the sum of $500, to be by
him invested as agent for Bliun in options on wheat at Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, or Chicago, Illinois, with instructions to invest the
money as he would his own. Norton, through his brokers, James
Keller & Co.,, immediately purchased in his own name, but for the
sole benefit of Blinn, 5000 bushels of wheat, at seller's option for
June delivery, at $1.42i per bushel, and deposited the money of
Blinn as a margin of ten cents per bushel. At the date for delivery
the price of wheat had advanced so that a profit of 8325 was realized on the transaction. This money, principal and profit, was
reinvested by Norton in subsequent transactions of like nature for
Blinn's benefit, but by reason of a decline in the market price
of wheat, in the latter part of June, the whole amount was
lost.
These transactions were mere speculations or ventures on the
future price of wheat, without any intention that the wheat would
be either paid for or delivered, but with intention that settlement
between the buyer and seller would be made on the difference between the price ,stated in the contract and the market price at the
date named for delivery. Such transactions Were unlawful in the
states of Illinois and Wisconsin, as well as in the state of Ohio.
The original suit was brought in the Court of Common Pleas
of Lucas county, by Blinn against Norton, to recover the sum of
$825 (the sum advanced and the profit on the first venture), with
interest.
On the trial testimony was offered by the plaintiff tending to
prove *that defendant had no authority to invest plaintiff's money,
save in a single purchase, namely, the purchase of 5000 bushels as
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above stated, whereupon the plaintiff requested the court to instruct
the jury as follows:
" If the jury shall find from the testimony that on or about the
time stated in the petition, the defendant received from the plaintiff the sum of $500 of the money of the latter, under an arrangement that the same should be invested by the defendant in wheat
transactions, of the illegal character mentioned in the answer, for
the benefit of the plaintiff; that said money was so invested by the
defendant, and a profit realized thereon; and that before the commencement of this action said sum of $500, and the profits so made,
came into and are still in the hands of the defendant, or that he
received credit therefor in the final settlement of his accounts with
the brokers, through whom said business was transacted, then the
plaintiff is entitled to recover said money from the defendant; nor,
in such case, can the defendant avoid his liability to account for
said moneys by showing that by the understanding between the
plaintiff and himself said money was to be employed in illegal
transactions in wheat, of the nature stated in his answer ; and that
said money was employed, and said profits realized in such transactions."
Which charge the court refused to give, and to such refusal the
plaintiff, by his counsel, then and there excepted.
The verdict of the jury was in favor of the defendant, and judgThis judgment, on petition in
ment was rendered accordingly.
and this proceeding is to
District
Court
reversed
by
the
error, was
reverse the judgment of the District Court.
Janes & Potter, for plaintiff in error.
C. IT Scribner and J. ITI1 Bitchie, for defendant in error.
J.-While it has ever been the policy of the law to
to an illegal transaction where it finds them, by
the
parties
leave
refusing relief to either in respect thereto, it has, on the other
hand, never regarded property or money employed therein or produced thereby as common plunder to be seized or retained by others
in no way interested in such business.
The question, however, in this case, arising on the refusal of the
Court of Common Pleas to charge the jury as requested lhy the
plaintiff, is this: May an agent who has transacted illegal business
McILVAiNx,
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for his principal, and has received money belonging to his principal and accruing from such business, defend himself, in a court of
law, against liability to account therefor, by showing such unlawful
business and his connection therewith as such agent ?
If the agent receiving such money had not been employed in
conducting such business, it would seem to be quite upon principles
of purest morality that he should account to his principal therefor;
but when the sole employment of the agent was to manage and
conduct the unlawful transactions, it seems to me, a much more
difficult question arises. In the latter case the agent is particeps
criminis. In offences against trade, and the like, the law regulating
the administration of penal justice does not recognise the relation
of principal and agent, unless the agent be an innocent instrument
merely. In such cases the guilty offenders against the law are all
principals ; hence, as between such, with some show of reason it
might be said that the law will afford no redress by civil
remedies.
The rulings upon this question, however, have been so uniformly
the other way, it becomes our duty to follow them unless we find
them totally repugnant to public policy and morality. Upon a
careful examination of the authorities, we find no such repugnancy
-indeed they commend themselves to our judgment.
In the first place the rule which denies civil remedies in such
cases, applies only to the parties to the illegal transaction. Public
policy does not require that one engaged in an unlawful enterprise
should by pleading it shield himself from liability for the wages of
his employees, agents or servants. It is enough that the rule
should be enforced as between those who have some interest in the
enterprise as principals.
In thesecond place it is contrary to public policy and good
morals to permit employees, agents or servants to seize or retain the
property of their principal, although it may be employed in illegal
business and undertheir control. No consideration of public policy can justify a lowering of the standard of moral honesty required
of persons in these relations.
And again, if parties to an illegal contract waive the illegality
and honestly account as between themselves, no other person can
be heard to complain of such accounting. Hence, we think, that
if in making such settlement, one of the guilty parties should deliver property or money to an agent of another to be delivered by
VoL. XXI.-99
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the agent to his principal, such agent is bound to account therefor
to his principal.
A leading case on this question is Tenant v. Elliott, 1 Bos. &
Pul. 2, where the defendant, a broker, effected an illegal insurance
for the plaintiff on a ship, and after a loss the underwriters paid
the amount of the insurance to the defendant, who refused to pay
the same over to plaintiff, on the ground that the insurance contract was illegal. Judgment for the plaintiff. EYE, 0. J., said:
"The defendant is not like a stockholder. The question is whether
he who has received money to another's use on an illegal contract,
can be allowed to retain it, and that not even at the desire of those
who paid it to him ? I think he cannot."
In Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wall. 70, it was held by the Supreme
Court of the United States, that "after a partnership contract confessedly against public policy has been carried out, and money
contributed by one of the partners was passed into other formsthe result of the contemplated operation completed-a partner in
whose hands the profits are, cannot refuse to account for and
divide them on the ground of the illegal character of the original
contract."
In Baldwin v. Potter, 46 Vt. 402, it was held that "an agent
is bound to account to his principal for money received in the course
of his agency for goods sold by his principal on orders obtained by
him as such agent on commission, although such sales, as between
the principal and purchaser, be illegal and void."
In -Evans v. Trenton, 4 Zabriskie 764, it was held: "The mere
agent of a party to an illegal transaction cannot set up the illegality
of the transaction in a suit by his principal to recover money that
has been paid to such agent for his principal on account of the illegal transaction. This defence can be set up only by a party to the
illegal action." In this case the illegal transaction was accomplished through the agent. See also Wood on Master and Servant,
sect. 202, where it is said:
"While the courts will not enforce an illegal contract, yet if a
servant or agent of another has, in the prosecution of an illegal
enterprise for his master, received money or other property belonging to the master, he is bound to turn it over to him, and cannot
shield himself from liability therefor upon the ground of the illegality of the original transaction."
The doctrine of these authorities, and many others which might
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be cited, is recognised, applied and enforced in German, sc., Congregation v. Stegner, 21 Ohio St. 488, wherein it is held: "While a
promissory note given to and discounted by a corporation for a loan
of money in the course of an unauthorized banking business will
not be enforced, yet where the treasurer of such corporation has
taken and appropriated to his private use moneys deposited with it,
contrary to the statutes against unauthorized banking, and being
unable when called on to refund the same, secures it by his promissory note, such note will not be held to have been given in the
course and furtherance of an illegitimate business, and an action
will lie thereon."
Judgment of the District Court affirmed.
The commonest form of actions between broker and principal arising out
of stock-jobbing or similar transactions
are those in which the broker sues his
principal to recover for margins he has
advanced on behalf of the principal.
The general rule certainly is that where
two parties are knowingly and wilfully
engaged in an illegal transaction, the
courts will assist neither party to recover
of the other for losses incurred in such
transaction on such other's behalf. But
the courts appear to have been astute to
find facts taking the cases out of this rule.
The sympathies of the judges seem to
have been in most cases with the person
advancing the funds, although both parties were engaged in an illegal transaction. As remarked by GRoss, J., in
Petrie v. Hannay, 3 Term Rep. 424,
"On the part of the defendant (who had
set up the illegality of the transaction as
a defence to an action for advances)
there is neither honor or honesty in'the
defence, and the plaintiffs ought to recover as much as the law can give them
without interfering with one of the most
politic and beneficial statutes that was
ever passed."
In the line of cases of which Rosewane
v. Billing, 15 0. B. N. S. 321, is an example, the action by a broker against his
principal for money advanced by the
broker upon his principal's wagering

contract, is sustained upon the subtle
ground that, notwithstanding such contracts were declared void by statute (8
and 9 Vict. c. 109), they were not, however, illegal. Said ERLE, 0. J. : "Now
the law as to gaming contracts is that all
such contracts are null and void, and no
action can be maintained upon them.
But they are not therefore illegal. The
parties making them are not liable to any
And see
action or to any penalties."
.Knight v. Cambers, 15 C. B. 562 ; Jessop
v. Lutwyche, 10 Exch. 614; Knight v.
.Etch, 15 C. B. 564.
Another ground upon which a recovery
of money advanced in furtherance or
execution of a wagering contract has
been based, is that a contract to pay the
money was made subsequent to the original wagering contract. This was the
view taken in Petrie v. Hannay, 3 T. R.
418, wherein it was decided that if two
persons jointly engage in a stock-jobbing
transaction and employ a broker to pay
the differences, and one of them repay
the whole sum to the broker with the privity and consent of the other, he may
recover a moiety from that other in an
action for money paid to his use. See
also aikney v. Reynous, 4 Burr. 2069 ;
Durant v. Burt, 98 MIass. 167 ; Owen v.
Davis, 1 Bailey 315 ; Arnstrongv. Toler,
11 Wheat. 274; Lehiaan v. Strassberger,
2 Woods 561.
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A third ground upon which brokers
have recovered' advances made by them
on behalf of their principals is that although the principal intended merely to
gamble, the broker on the other hand
acted in good faith and actually purchased
the commodity or stocks for his principal.
As remarked in Hlibblewhite v. .lMcMorine,
5 M. & W. 462, "it cannot be a wager
unless both parties are cognisant of the
facts." See, also, Lehman v. Strassberger, 2 Woods 564; Ashton v. Dakin, 4
H. & N. 867 ; Gregory v. Wendell, 39
Mich. 337.
Where A., through a factor, makes a
contract with B. for the purchase or sale of
cotton for future delivery, intending that
there should be no delivery but that the
contract should be performed by the payment of differences, but this purpose is
not shown to be also the purpose of B. :
Held, that a note given by A. to the factor for money advanced by him to pay
losses on such contracts, and for his commissions in making the same, was a valid
and binding obligation: Lehman v.
Strassberger, 2 Woods 555.
And further to the general proposition
that a broker may recover his advances,
see Brown v. Speyers, 20 Grat. 309 ;
Kingsbury v. Kirwan, 6 Cent. Law
Jour. 228. Wyn~a v. Fiske, 3 Allen
238; Durant v. Burt, 98 Mass. 161 ;
Warren v. Hewitt, 45 Geo. 501 ; Winchester v. .A\utter, 52 N. H. 507; Mfarshall v. Thurston, 3 Lea 740 ; Note to
Sawyer v. Taggart, 18 Am. Law. Reg.
(N. S.) p. 230 ; Armstrong v. Toler, 11
Wheat. 258 ; Gilbert v. Gaugar, 8 Biss.
214; Thatcher v. Hardy, L. R., 4 Q. B.
685; a. 0. 18 Am. L. R. 254, and note;
Ex parte Pyke, L. R., 8 Ch. Div. 756 ;
Reed v. Anderson, L. R., 10 Q. B. 100.
There is, however, no lack of authority holding that a broker cannot recover
for advances made for his principal in a
stock, or grain gambling transaction.
Perhaps the best considered case is Barnard v. Backhaus, 52 Wis. 603, wherein
a note given by a principal to his broker

for services rendered and money advanced in settling gambling grain contracts was held void. "They (the brokers) were engaged equally with him
(the principal) in the transaction of illegal business; and the fact that they were
executing the orders of their principal
does not render them any the less blameworthy. All were engaged in the furtherance of illegal objects--making contracts which were unlawful , consequently
a note given for money which they paid
in the settlement of their contracts is
tainted with illegality:" Barnard v.
Backhans, 52 Wis. 603. See also Rudolph v. Winters, 7 Neb. 134.
A. being employed as a broker for B.
in stock-jobbing transactions paid the
differences for him; a dispute arising between them respecting the amount of
A.'s demand, the matter was referred to
C., who awarded 3601. to be due; on
which A. drew on B. for 1001., part of
the above, and indorsed the bill to C.,
the arbitrator, after B. had accepted it:
Held, that C. could not recover on the
bill: Steers v. Lashley, 6 T. R. 61.
Where the whole amount deposited by
a minor as margins is lost in stock
gambling he is at liberty to recover back
at any time, from the brokers employed
by him the amount so deposited, and this
even if the brokers did not know they
were dealing with a minor: GORDON,

J.,

intimated that the doctrine that where
an infant has executed a contract and
enjoyed the benefit of it, and afterwards
on coming of age seeks to avoid it, be
must first restore the consideration which
he has received-that he cannot have the
benefit on one side without restoring the
equivalent on the other, may and certainly
does apply in some cases, but as a general
rule is unsound, and certainly without
application in this case : Ruchizky v.
DeHaven, 97 Penn. St. 202.
A. directed B., a stockbroker, to sell
on his account 500 shares of stock
"short."
It did not appear whether A.
owned the stock or not. He gave no
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cerlificate to B., and arranged with him
that there was to be no actual delivery
of the stock between them, but that A.
was to protect B. from loss if the market value of the stock advanced, and receive the difference in value from B., if
it declined. There was no agreement
that B. should not make actual delivery
of the stock he was instructed to sell.
B. sold accordingly, and afterwards the
price rose. B. then borrowed from a fellow broker the necessary certificates to
make delivery and did deliver them and
receive payment therefor through his
clearing-house sheet. The price still
rising B. subsequently bought on A.'s
order 500 like shares, to make good his
loan, receiving them and paying for them
also through his clearing-bouse sheet.
He paid also the lender the amount of an
intermediate dividend on the stock. In
an action by B. against A. to recover
the amount expended for A.'s use in these
transactions, it was decided that B. could
not recover, because the evidence showed
that the transactions were mere gambling
contracts, and as such contrary to law:
Dickson v. Thomas, 97 Penn. St. 279.
It has been also held that money advanced by a principal to an agent to enable the latter to create a" corner" is not
recoverable by the principal: Sampson v.
Shaw, 101 Mass. 150. And see further rn
re Green, 15 Nat. Bank. Reg. 199.
From this brief review of the cases it
appears that there is some conflict of
authority upon the question whether
where broker and principal are both engaged in a gambling transaction the former can recover for advances made on
behalf of his principal; or conversely if
those transactions result profitably, whetier the principal can compel his broker
to account for the profits.
There is no doubt whatever that a multitude of the transactions in grain, produce, stocks and securities are mere
wagers upon fluctuations in prices. There

being no intention to accept or to deliver
the commodity or security bought or sold,
these "deals" are gambling transactions,
and this form of gambling is of the most
pernicious and demoralizing kind. It
acquires a sort of quasi respectability from
the fact, that in form it is similar to the
legitimate sales and deliveries of securities or commodities upon the great exchanges or boards of trade in the larger
cities. Being gambling under the cloak
of honest trading thousands engage in it
who would never for a moment permit
themselves to enter a "gambling-hell,"
and to bet upon the turn of a card.
Clerks, school teachers, mechanics, farmers, men and women of every age and
station in society are found I speculating" upon" margins," through commission men or brokers upon the exchanges
or boards of trade, or personally upon
the various "open boards" and "bucketshops," which within a few years past
have been established in the larger cities
as an evidence of the recent increase and
magnitude of unhealthy speculation and
fictitious trading.
It might be well, considering the pernicious and seductive character of this
form of gambling, and its great increase
within recent years, for courts to give the
principle of law which declares wagering
contracts in securities or produce to be
illegal and void a liberal enforcement, so
as to punish those who engage in such
unlawful ventures, whether as principals
or as agents by refusing to protect them
against or to indemnify them for each
other's breach of faith.
The example of the Pennsylvania and
Wisconsin courts in refusing to countenance these speculative practices is conmendable, and if vigorously followed by
other tribunals cannot but have a wholesome influence in restraining this species
of gambling.
ADEaERT RutxILTOlt.

Chicago.
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Supreme Court of the United States.
THE UNITED STATES v. MURRAY STANLEY.
SAME v. MICHAEL RYAN.
SAME v. SAMUEL NICHOLS.
SAME v: SAMUEL D. SINGLETON.
ROBINSON v. MEMPHIS AND CHARLESTON RAILROAD CO.
The 1st and 2d sections of the Civil Rights Act, passed March 1st 1875, are unconstitutional enactments as applied to the several states, not being authorized either
by the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.
The Fourteenth Amendment is prohibitory upon the states only, and the legislation
authorized to be adopted by Congress for enforcing it is not direct legislation on the
matters respecting which the states are prohibited from making or enforcing certain
laws, or doing certain acts, but is corrective legislation, such as may be necessary or
proper for counteracting and redressing the effect of such laws or acts.
The Thirteenth Amendment relates only to slavery and involuntary servitude
(which it abolishes); and although, by its reflex action, it establishes universal freedom
in tht United States, and Congress may probably pass laws directly enforcing
its provisions, yet such legislative power extends only to the subject of slavery
and its incidents ; and the denial of equal accommodations in inns, public conveyarces and places of public amusement (which is forbidden by the sections in question), imposes no badge of slavery or involuntary servitude upon the party, but
at most infringes rights which are protected from state aggression by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Whether the accommodations and privileges sought to be protected by the 1st
and 2d sections of the Civil Rights Act are or are not rights constitutionally
demandable, and if they are, in what form they are to be protected, is not now
decided.
Nor is it decided whether the law as it stands is operative in the territories
and District of Columbia ; the decision only relating to its validity as applied to
the states.
Nor is it decided whether Congress, under the commercial power, may or may not
pass a law securing to all persons equal accommodations on lines of public conveyance between two or more states.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
BRADLEY, J.-These cases are all founded on the 1st and 2d

sections of the Act of Congress, known as the Civil Rights Act,
passed March lst 1875, entitled "An act to protect all citizens in
their civil, and legal rights :" 18 Stat. 335. Two of the cases,
those against Stanley and Nichols, are indictments for denying to
persons of color the accommodations and privileges of an inn or
hotel; two of them, those against Ryan and Singleton, are, one an
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information, the other an indictment, for denying to individuals the
privileges and accommodations of a theatre, the information against
Ryan being for refusing a colored person a seat in the dress circle
of Maguire's theatre in San Francisco, and the indictment against
Singleton being for denying to another person, whose color is not
stated, the full enjoyment of the accommodations of the theatre
known as the Grand Opera House in New York, "1said denial not
being made for any reasons by law applicable to citizens of every
race and color, and regardless of any previous condition of servitude." The case of Robinson, and Mfe against The l kmphis
Charleston Railroad 0o, was an action brought in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee,
to recover the penalty of 500 given by the 2d section of the act,
and the gravamen was the refusal by the conductor of the railroad
company to allow the wife to ride in the ladies' car, for the reason,
as stated in one of the counts, that she was a person of African
descent. The jury rendered a verdict for the defendants in this
case upon the merits under a charge of the court to which a bill of
exceptions was taken by the plaintiffs. The case 'was tried on the
assumption by both parties of the validity of the act of Congress ;
and the principal point made by the exceptions was that the judge
allowed evidence to go to the jury tending to show that the conductor had reason to suspect that the plaintiff, the wife, was an
improper person, because she was in company with a young
man whom he supposed to be a white man, and on that account
inferred that there was some improper connection between them,
and the judge charged the jury, in substance,- that if this was
the conductor's bona fide reason for excluding the woman from
the car, they might take it into consideration on the question of the
liability of the company. The case is brought here by writ of error
at the suit of the plaintiffs. The cases of Stanley, Nichols and
Singleton, come up on certificates of division of opinion between
the judges below as to the constitutionality of the 1st and 2d sections of the act referred to, and the case of Ryan, on a writ of
error to the judgment of the Circuit Court for the District of California sustaining a demurrer to the information.
It is obvious that the primary and important question in all the
cases, is the constitutionality of the law; for if the l6w is unconstitutional none of the prosecutions can stand.
The sections of the law referred to provide as follows:
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"Sect. 1. That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, public
conveyances on land or water, theatres and other places of public
amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and
color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.
"Sect. 2. That any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any citizen, except for reasons by law applicable
to citizens of every race and color, and regardless of any previous
condition of servitude, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges in said section enumerated, or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall for every such
offence forfeit and pay the sum of $500 to the person aggrieved
thereby, to be recovered in an action of debt, with full costs ; and
shall also, for every such offence, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than
$500 nor more than $1000, or shall be imprisoned not less than
thirty days nor more than one year : Provided, that all persons
may elect to sue for the penalty aforesaid, or to proceed under their
rights at common law and by state statutes; and having so elected
to proceed in the one mode or the other, their right to proceed in
the other jurisdiction shall be barred. But this provision shall not
apply to criminal proceedings, either under this act or the criminal
law of any state. And provided further, that a judgment for the
penalty in favor of the party aggrieved, or a judgment upon an
indictment, shall be a bar to either prosecution respectively."
Are these sections constitutional ? The first section, which is
the principal one, cannot be fairly understood without attending to
the last clause, which qualifies the preceding part. The essence of
the law is not to declare broadly that all persons shall be entitled
to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities and privileges of inns, public conveyances and theatres;
but that such enjoyment shall not be subject to any conditions applicable only to citizens of a particular race or color, or who had
been in a previous condition of servitude. In other words, it is the
purpose of the law to declare that, in the enjoyment of the accommodations and privileges of inns, public conveyances, theatres and
other places of public amusement, no distinction shall be made between citizens of different race or color, or between those who have,
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and those who have not, been slaves. Its effect is to declare that
in all inns, public conveyances and places of amusement, colored
citizens, whether formerly slaves or not, and citizens of other races,
shall have the same accommodations and privileges in all inns, public conveyances and places of amusement as are enjoyed by white
citizens; and vice versa. The second section makes it a penal
offence in any person to deny to any citizen of any race or color,
regardless of previous servitude, any of the accommodations or
privileges mentioned in the first section.
Has Congress constitutional power to make such a law ? Of
course no one will contend that the power to pass it was contained
in the Constitution before the adoption of the last three amendments. The power is sought, first, in the XIVth Amendment, and
the views and arguments of distinguished senators, advanced whilst
the law was under consideration, claiming authority to pass it by
virtue of that amendment, are the principal arguments adduced in
favor of the power. We have carefully considered those arguments,
as was due to the eminent ability of those who put them forward,
and have felt, in all its force, the weight of authority which always
invests a law that Congress deems itself competent to pass. But
the responsibility of an independent judgment is now thrown upon
this court; and we are bound to exercise it according to the best
lights we have.
The first section of the XIVth Amendment (which is the one
relied on), after declaring who shall be citizens of the United States,
and of the several states, is prohibitory in its character, and prohibitory upon the states. It declares that "no state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subjectmatter of the amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It
nullifies and makes void all state legislation, and state action of
every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of law, or which denies to any of them
the equal protection of the laws. It not only does this but, in order
that the national will thus declared may not be a mere bfutur fulVOL. XXXI.-100
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men, the last section of the amendment invests Congress with
power to enforce it by appropriate legislation. To enforce what ?
To enforce the prohibition. To adopt appropriate legislation for
correcting the effects of such prohibited state laws and state
acts, and thus to render them effectually null, void and innocuous.
This is the legislative power conferred upon Congress, and this is
the whole of it. It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upop subjects which are within the domain of state legislation,
but to provide modes of relief against state legislation, or state
action, of the kind referred to. It does not authorize Congress to
create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights,
but to provide modes of redress against the operation of state laws
and the action of state officers, executive or judicial, when these are
subverdive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment.
Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the
XIVth Amendment; but they are secured by way of prohibition
against state laws and state proceedings affecting those rights and
privileges, and by power given to Congress to legislate for the purpose of carrying such prohibition into effect; and such legislation
must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed state laws or
state proceedings, and be directed to the correction of their operation and effect. A quite full discussion of this aspect of the
amendment may be found in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S.
542; Virginia v. .Rives, 100 Id. 313; and -Ex parte T irginia,
Id. 339.
An apt illustration of this distinction may be found in some of
the provisions of the original Constitution. Take the subject of
contracts, for example. The Constitution prohibited' the states from
passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. This did
not give to Congress power to provide laws for the general enforcement of contracts; nor power to invest the courts of the United
States with jurisdiction over contracts, so as to enable parties to sue
upon them in those courts. It did, however, give the power to provide remedies by which the impairment of contracts by state legislation might be counteracted and corrected; and this power was
exercised. The remedy which Congress actually provided was that
contained in the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, giving
to the Supreme Court of the United States jurisdiction by writ of
error to review the final decisions of state courts whenever they
should sustain the validity of a state statute or authority alleged to
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be repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States. By
this means, if a state law was passed impairing the obligation of a
contract, and the state tribunals sustained the validity of the law,
the mischief could be corrected in this court. The legislation of
Congress, and the proceedings provided for under it, were corrective
in their character. No attempt was made to draw into the United
States courts the litigation of contracts generally ; and no such
attempt would have been sustained. We do not say that the remedy provided was the only one that might have been provided in
that case. Probably Congress had power to pass a law giving to
the courts of the United States direct jurisdiction over contracts
alleged to be impaired by a state law; and under the broad provisions of the Act of March 3d 1875, giving to the circuit courts
jurisdiction of all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of
the United States, it is possible that such jurisdiction now exists.
But under that, or any other law, it must appear as well by allegation, as proof at the trial, that the Constitution had been violated
by the action of the state legislature. Some obnoxious state law
passed, or that might be passed, is necessary to be assumed in order
to lay the foundation of any federal remedy in the case; and for
the very sufficient reason that the constitutional prohibition is
against state laws impairing the obligation of contracts.
And so in the present case, until some state law has been passed,
or some state action through its officers or agents has been taken,
adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the
XIVth Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said
amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called
into activity; for the prohibitions of the amendment are against
state laws and acts done under state authority. Of course legislation may, and should be, provided in advance to meet the exigency
when it arises ; but it should be adapted to the mischief and wrong.
which the amendment was intended to- provide against; and that is
state laws or state action of some kind adverse to the rights of the
citizen secured by the amendment. Such legislation cannot properly cover the whole domain of rights appertaining to life, liberty'
and property, defining them and providing for their vindication.
That would be to establish a code of municipal law regulative of
all private rights between man and man in society. It would be to
make Congress take the place of the state legislatures and to supersede them. It is absurd to affirm that because the rights of life,
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liberty and property (which include all civil rights that men have)
are by the amendment sought to be protected against invasion on
the part of the state without due process of law, Congress may
therefore provide due process of law for their vindication in every
case; and that because the denial by a state to any persons, of the
equal protection of the laws, is prohibited by the amendment, therefore Congress may establish laws for their equal protection. In
fine, the legislation which Congress is authorized to adopt in this
behalf is not general legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but
corrective legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper
for counteracting such laws as the states may adopt or enforce and
which, by the amendment, they are prohibited from making or
enforcing, or such acts and proceedings as the states may commit
or take and which, by the amendment, they are prohibited from
committing or taking. It is not necessary for us to state, if we
could, what legislation would be proper for Congress to adopt. It
is sufficient for us to examine whether the law in question is of
that character.
An inspection of the law shows that it makes no reference whatever to any supposed or apprehended violation of the XIYth
Amendment on the part of the states. It is not predicated on
any such view. It proceeds ex directo to declare that certain acts
committed by individuals shall be deemed offences, and shall be
prosecuted and punished by proceedings in the courts of the United
States. It does not profess to be corrective of any constitutional
wrong committed by the states; it does not make its operation to
depend upon any such wrong committed. It applies equally to
cases arising in states which have the justest laws respecting the
personal rights of citizens, and whose authorities are ever ready to
enforce such laws, as to those which arise in states that may have
violated the prohibition of the amendment. In other words, it
steps into the domain of local jurisprudence, and lays down rules
for the conduct of individuals in society towards each other, and
imposes sanctions for the enforcement of those rules, without
referring in any manner to any supposed action of the state or its
authorities.
If this legislation is appropriate for enforcing the prohibitions
of the amendment, it is difficult to see where it is to stop. Why
may not Congress with equal show of authority enact a code of
laws for the enforcement and vindication of all rights of life, lib-
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erty and property ? If it is supposable that the states may deprive
persons of life, liberty and property without due process of law
(and the amendment itself does suppose this), why should not Congress proceed at once to prescribe due process of law for the protection of every one of these fundamental rights, in every possible
case, as well as to prescribe equal privileges in inns, public conveyances and theatres ? The truth is that the implication of a power
to legislate in this manner is based upon the assumption that if the
states are forbidden to legislate or act in a particular way on a particular subject, and power is conferred upon Congress to enforce the
prohibition, this gives Congress power to legislate generally upon
that subject, and not merely power to provide modes of redress
against such state legislation or action. The assumption is certainly unsound. It is repugnant to the Xth Amendment of the
Constitution,which declares that powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the states respectively or to the people.
We have not overlooked the fact that the 4th section of the act
now under consideration has been held by this court to be constitutional. That se.ction declares "that no citizen, possessing all other
qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law, shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the
United States, or of any state, on account of race, color or previous
condition of servitude; and any officer or other person charged
with any duty in the selection or summoning of jurors who shall
exclude or fail to summon any citizen for the cause aforesaid shall,
on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be
fined not more than $5000." In -Ex parte -Virginia,100 U. S.
339, it was held that an indictment against a state officer under this
section for excluding persons of color from the jury list is sustainable. But a moment's attention to its terms will show that ttie
section is entirely corrective in its character. Disqualifications for
service on juries are only created by the law, and the first part of
the section is aimed at certain disqualifying laws, namely, those
which make mere race or color a disqualification; and the second
clause is directed against those who, assuming to use the authority
of the state government, carry into effect such a rule of disqualification. In the VPirginiacase, the state, through its officer, enforced
a rule of disqualification which the law was intended to abrogate
and counteract. Whether the statute book of the state actually
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laid down any such rule of disqualification or not, the state, through
its officer, enforced such a rule; and it is against such state action,
through its officers and agents, that the last clause of the section is
directed. This aspect of the law was deemed sufficient to divest
it of any unconstitutional character, and makes it differ widely
from the first and second sections of the same act which we are
now considering.
These sections, in the objectionable features before referred to,
are different also from the law ordinarily called the " C i vil Rights
Bill," originally passed April 9th 1866, and re-enacted with some
modifications in sections 16, 17, 18 of the Enforcement Act, passed
May 31st 1870. That law, as re-enacted, after declaring that all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every state and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions of every
kind, and none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the contrary notwithstanding, proceeds to enact that any
person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation
or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant
of any state or territory to the deprivation of any rights secured
or protected by the preceding section (above quoted), or to different
punishment, pains or penalties, on account of such person being an
alien, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the
punishment of citizens, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and subject to fine and imprisonment as specified in the act. This
law is clearly corrective in its character, intended to counteract and
furnish redress against state laws and proceedings, and customs haying the force of law, which sanction the wrongful acts specified.
In the Revised Statutes, it is true, a very important clause, to wit,
the words "any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the
contrary notwithstanding," which gave the declaratory section its
point and effect, are omitted ; but the penal part, by which the declaration is enforced, and which is really the effective part of the law,
retains the reference to state laws, by making the penalty apply
only to those who should subject parties to a deprivation of their
rights under color of any statute, ordinance, custom, &c., of any
state or territory ; thus preserving the corrective character of the
-
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legislation : Rev. Stats., sects. 1977, 1978, 1979, 5510. The Civil
Rights Bill here referred to is analogous in its character to what a
law would have been under the original Constitution, declaring that
the validity of contracts should not be impaired, and that if any
person bound by a contract should refuse to comply with it under
color or pretence that it had been rendered void or invalid by a state
law, he should be liable to an action upon it in the courts of the
United States, with the addition of a penalty for setting up such an
unjust and unconstitutional defence.
In this connection it is proper to state that civil rights, such as
are guaranteed by the Constitution against state aggression, cannot
be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by
state authority in the shape of laws, customs or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported
by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that
individual; an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is
true, whether they affect his person, his property or his reputation;
but if not sanctioned in some way by the state, or not done under
state authority, his rights remain in full force, and may presumably
be vindicated by resort to the laws of the state for redress. An
individual cannot deprive a man of his right to vote, to hold property, to buy and to sell, to sue in the courts or to be a witness
or a juror; he may, by force or fraud, interfere with the enjoyment
of the right in a particular case ; he may commit an assault against
the person, or commit murder, or use ruffian violence at the polls,
or slander the good name of a fellow citizen; but unless protected
in these wrongful acts by some shield of state law or state authority, he cannot destroy or injure the right; he will only render himself amenable to satisfaction or punishment; and amenable therefor
to the laws of the state where the wrongful acts are committed.
Hence, in all these cases where the Constitution seeks to protect the
rights of the citizen against discriminative and unjust laws of the
state by prohibiting such laws, it is not individual offences, but
abrogation and denial of rights, which it denounces, and for which
it clothes the Congress with power to provide a remedy. This abrogation and denial of rights, for which the states alone were or
could be responsible, was the great seminal and fundamental wrong
which was intended to be remedied. And the remedy to be provided must necessarily be predicated upon that wrong. It must
assume that in the cases provided for, the evil or wrong actually
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committed rests upon some state law or state authority for its
excuse and perpetration.
Of course, these remarks do not apply to those cases in which
Congress is clothed with direct and plenary powers of legislation
over the whole subject, accompanied with an express or implied
denial of such-power to the states, as in the regulation of commerce
with foreign nations, among the several states and -with the Indian
tribes, the coining of money, the establishment of post-offices and
post-roads, the declaring of war, &c. In these cases Congress has
power to pass laws for regulating the subjects specified in every
detail, and the conduct and transactions of individuals in respect
thereof. But where a subject is not submitted to the general legislative power of Congress, but is only submitted thereto for the purpose of rendering effective some prohibition against particular state
legislation or state action in reference to that subject, the power
given is limited by its object, and any legislation by Congress in
the matter must necessarily be corrective in its character, adapted
to counteract and redress the operation of such prohibited state laws
or proceedings of state officers.
If the principles of interpretation which we have laid down are
correct, as we deem them to be (and they are in accord with the
principles laid down in the cases before referred to, as well as in
the recent case of United States v. Harris,decided at the last term
of this court), it is clear that the law in question cannot be sustained by any grant of legislative power made to Congress by the
XIVth Amendment. That amendment prohibits the states from
denying to any person the equal protection of the laws, and declares
that Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of the amendment. The law in question without any reference to adverse state legislation on the subject, declares
that all persons shall be entitled to equal accommodations and privileges of inns, public conveyances and places of public amusement,
and imposes a penalty upon any individual who shall deny to any
This is not
citizen such equal accommodations and privileges.
corrective legislation; it is primary and direct; it takes immediate
and absolute possession of the subject of the right of admission to
inns, public conveyances and places of amusement. It supersedes
and displaces state legislation on the same subject, or only allows it
permissive force. It ignores such legislation and assumes that the
matter is one that belongs to the domain of national regulation.
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Whether it would not have been a more effective protection of the
rights of citizens to have clothed Congress with plenary power over
the whole subject, is not now the question. What we have to decide is, whether such plenary power has been conferred upon Congress by the XIVth Amendment; and in our judgment it has
not.
We have discussed the question presented by the law on the
assumption that a right to enjoy equal accommodations and privileges in all inns, public conveyances and places of public amusement, is one of the essential rights of the citizen which no state
can abridge or interfere with. Whether it is such a right or not is
a different question which, in the view we have taken of the validity
of the law on the ground already stated, it is not necessary to
examine.
We have also discussed the validity of the law in reference to
cases arising in the states only; and not in reference to cases arising in the Territories or the District of Columbia, which are subject
to the plenary legislation of Congress in every branch of municipal regulation. Whether the law would be a valid one as applied
to the Territories and the District is not a question for consideration in the cases before us; they all being cases arising within
the limits of states. And whether Congress, in the exercise of
its power to regulate commerce amongst the several states, might
or might not pass a law regulating rights in public conveyances
passing from one state to another, is also a question which is not
now before us, as the sections in auestion are not conceived in
any such view.
But the power of Congress to adopt direct and primary, as
distinguished from corrective legislation on the subject in hand, is
sought, in the second place, from the XIIIth Amendment, which
abolishes slavery. This amendment declares "that neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime,
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction ;" and
it gives Congress power to enforce the amendment by appropriate
legislation.
This amendment, as well as the XIVth, is undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances. By its own unaided
force and effect it abolished slavery and established universal free-.
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dom. Still legislation may be necessary and proper to meet all
the various cases and circumstances to be affected by it, and to
prescribe proper modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit.
And such legislation may be primary and direct in its character;
for the amendment is not a mere prohibition of state laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the
United States.
It is true that slavery caninot exist without law, any more than
property in lands and goods can exist without law; and, therefore,
the XIIIth Amendment may be regarded as nullifying all state
laws which establish or uphold slavery. But it has a reflex character also, establishing and decreeing universal civil and political
freedom throughout the United States; and it is assumed that the
power vested in Congress to enforce the article by appropriate legislation clothes Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and
proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the
United States; and upon this assumption it is claimed that this is
sufficient authority for declaring by law that all persons shall have
equal accommodations and privileges in all inns, public conveyances
and places of public amusement; the argument being that the
denial of such equal accommodations and privileges is in itself a
subjection to a species of servitude within the meaning of the
amendment. Conceding the major proposition to be true that
Congress has a right to enact all necessary and proper laws for
the obliteration and prevention of slavery, with all its badges and
incidents, is the minor proposition also true, that the denial to any
person of admission to the accommodations and privileges of an inn,
a public conveyance or a theatre, does subject that person to any
form of servitude or tend to fasten upon him any badge of slavery? If it does not, then power to pass the law is not found in
the XIIIth Amendment.
In a very able and learned presentation of the cognate question
as to the extent of the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens
which cannot rightfully be abridged by state laws under the XIYth
Amendment, made in a former case, a long list of burdens and
disabilities of a servile character, incident to feudal vassalage in
France, and which were abolished by the decrees of -the National
Assembly, was presented for the purpose of showing that all inequalities and observances exacted by one man from another, were
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servitudes or badges of slavery, which a great nation, in its effort
to establish universal liberty, made haste to wipe out and destroy.
But these were servitudes imposed by the old law, or by long
custom which had the force of law, and exacted by one man from
another without the latter's consent. Should any such servitudes
be imposed by a state law, there can be no doubt that the law
would be repugnant to the XIVth, no less than to the XTIIth
Amendment; nor any greater doubt that Congress has adequate
power to forbid any such servitude from being exacted.
But is there any similarity between such servitudes and a denial
by the owner of an inn, a public conveyance or a theatre, of its
accommodations and privileges to an individual, even though the
denial be founded on the race or color of that individual ? Where
does any slavery or servitude, or badge of either, arise from such
an act of denial ? Whether it might not be a denial of a right
which, if sanctioned by the state law, would be obnoxious to the
prohibitions of the XIVth Amendment, is another question. But
what has it to do with the question of slavery ?
It may be that by the black code (as it was called), in the times
when slavery prevailed, the proprietors of inns and public conveyances were forbidden to receive persons of the African race,
because it might assist slaves to escape from the control of their
masters. This was merely a means of preventing such escapes,
and was ho part of the servitude itself. A law of that kind could
not have any such object now, however justly it might be deemed
an invasion of the party's legal rights as a citizen, and amenable
to the prohibitions of the XIVth Amendment.
The long existence of African slavery in this country gave us
very distinct notions of what it was, and what were its necessary
incidents. Compulsory service of the slave for the benefit of the
master, restraint of his movements except by the master's will,
disability to hold property, to make contracts, to have a standing
in court, to be a witness against a white person, and such like
burdens and incapacities were the inseparable .incidents of the
institution. Severer punishments for crimes were imposed on the
slave than on free persons guilty of the same offences. Congress,
as we have seen, by the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, passed in view
of the XIIIth Amendment, before the XIVth was adopted, undertook to wipe out these burdens and disabilities, the necessary incidents of slavery, constituting its substance and visible form; and
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to secure to all citizens of every race and color, and without regard
to previous servitude, those fundamental rights which are the
essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens. Whether this legislation was fully authorized by the
XIIIth Amendment alone, without the support which it afterwards received from the XIVth Amendment, after the adoption of
which it was re-enacted with some additions, it is not necessary to
inquire. It is referred to for the purpose of showing that at that
time (in 1866) Congress did not assume, under the authority
given by the XHIth Amendment, to adjust what may be called
the social rights of men and races in the community; but only to
declare and vindicate those fundamental rights which appertain
to the essence of citizenship, and the enjoyment or deprivation
of which constitutes the essential distinction between freedom and
slavery.
We must not forget that the province and scope of the XITIth
and XIVth Amendments are different; the former simply abolished
slavery : the latter prohibited the states from abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, from depriving
them of life, liberty or property without due process of law, and
from denying to any the equal protection of the laws. The amendments are different, and the powers of Congress under them are
different. What Congress has power to do under one, it may not
have power to do under the other. Under the XIIIth Amendment, it has only to do. with slavery and its incidents. Under the
XIVth Amenilment, it has power to counteract and render nugatory all state laws and proceedings which have the effect to abridge
any of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,
or to deprive them of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, or to deny to any of them the equal protection of the laws,
Under the XIIIth Amendment, the legislation, so far as necessary
or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery and involuntary servitude, may be direct and primary, operating upon the
acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by state legislation or not ;
under the XIrth, as we have already shown, it must necessarily
be, and can only be, corrective in its character, addressed to
counteract and afford relief against state regulations or proceedings.
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The only question under the present head, therefore, is, whether
the refusal to any persons of the accommodations of an inn, or a
public conveyance, or a place of public amusement, by an individual, and without any sanction or support from any state law or
regulation, does inflict upon such persons any manner of servitude,
or form of slavery, as those terms are understood in this country?
Many wrongs may be obnoxious to the prohibitions of the XIVth
Amendment which are not, in any just sense, incidents or elements
of slavery. Such, for example, would be the taking of private
property without due process of law; or allowing persons who
have committed certain crimes (horse stealing, for example,) to be
seized and hung by the posse comitatus without regular trial; or
denying to any person or class of persons, the right to pursue any
peaceful avocations allowed to others. What is called class legislation would belong to this category, and would be obnoxious to
the prohibitions of the XIYth Amendment, but would not necessarily be so to the XIIIth, when not involving the idea of any
subjection of one man to another. The XIIIth Amendment has
respect, not to distinctions of race, or class, or color, but to slavery.
The XIVth Amendment extends its protection to races and classes,
and prohibits any state legislation which has the effect of denying
to any race or class, or to any individual, the equal protection of
the laws.
Now, conceding, for the sake of the argument, that the admission
to an inn, a public conveyance, or a place of public amusement, on
equal terms with all other citizens, is the right of every man and
all classes of men, is it any more than one of those rights which
the states by the XIYth Amendment are forbidden to deny to any
person ? And is the Constitution violated until the denial of the
right has some state sanction or authority ? Can the act of a mere
individual, the owner of the inn, the public conveyance or place
of amusement, refusing the accommodation, be justly regarded as
imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant, or
only as inflicting an ordinary civil injury, properly cognizable by
the laws of the state, and presumably subject to redress by those
laws until the contrary appears ?
After giving to these questions all the consideration which their
importance demands, we are forced to the conclusion that such an
act of refusal has nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude, and that if it is violative of any right of the party, his
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redress is to be sought under the laws of the state; or if those
laws are adverse to his rights and do not protect him, his remedy
will be found in the corrective legislation which Congress has
adopted, or may adopt, for counteracting the effect of state laws,
or state action, prohibited by the XIVth Amendment. It would
be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply
to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make
as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take
into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or
deal with in other matters of intercourse or business. Inn-keepers
and public carriers, by the laws of all the states, so far as we are
aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper
accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith
apply for them. If the laws themselves make any unjust discrimination, amenable to the prohibitions of the XIVth Amendment,
Congress has full polver to afford a remedy under that amendment and in accordance with it.
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants
of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be
the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or
a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other
men's rights are protected. There were thousands of free colored
people in this country before the abolition of slavery, enjoying all
the essential rights of life, liberty and property the same as white
citizens ; yet no one, at that time, thought that it was any invasion of their persbnal status as freemen because they were not
admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because
they were subjected to discriminations in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public conveyances and places of amusement.
MIere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded
as badges of slavery. If, since that time, the enjoyment of equal
rights in all these respects has become established by constitutional enactment, it is not by force of the XIIIth Amendment
(which merely abolishes slavery), but by force of the XIVth and
XYth Amendments.
On the whole we are of opinion, that no countenance of authority
for the passage of the law in question can be found in either the
XIIIth or XIVth Amendments of the Constitution; and no other

